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Abstract: The literature assessing the efficacy of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly 
known as the Food Stamp Program, has long puzzled over positive associations between SNAP receipt and various 
undesirable health outcomes such as food insecurity.  Assessing the causal impacts of SNAP, however, is hampered 
by two key identification problems: endogenous selection into participation and extensive systematic underreporting 
of participation status.  Using data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), we 
extend partial identification bounding methods to account for these two identification problems in a single unifying 
framework.  Specifically, we derive informative bounds on the average treatment effect of SNAP on child food 
insecurity, general poor health, obesity, and anemia across a range of different assumptions used to address the 
selection and classification error problems.  In particular, to address the selection problem we apply relatively weak 
nonparametric assumptions on the latent outcomes, selected treatments, and observed covariates.  To address the 
classification error problem, we formalize a new approach that uses auxiliary administrative data on the size of the 
SNAP caseload to restrict the magnitudes and patterns of SNAP reporting errors.  Layering successively stronger 
assumptions, an objective of our analysis is to make transparent how the strength of the conclusions varies with the 
strength of the identifying assumptions.  Under the weakest restrictions, there is substantial ambiguity: we cannot 
rule out the possibility that SNAP increases or decreases poor health.  Under stronger but plausible assumptions 
used to address the selection and classification error problems, we find that commonly cited relationships between 
SNAP and poor health outcomes provide a misleading picture about the true impacts of the program.  Our tightest 
bounds identify favorable impacts of SNAP on child health.    
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I.  Introduction 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, is 
by far the largest food assistance program in the United States and, as such, constitutes a crucial 
component of the social safety net in the United States.  In any given month during 2009, SNAP provided 
assistance to more than 15 million children (Leftin, Gothro, and Eslami 2010), and it is estimated that 
nearly one in two American children will receive assistance during their childhood (Rank and Hirschl, 
2009).  As a consequence, policymakers expect this program to have major beneficial impacts on 
numerous health and nutrition challenges facing the nation, particularly for low-income children who 
constitute half of the recipients.  Paradoxically, however, the vast empirical literature examining the 
impact of SNAP on health reveals little supporting evidence regarding the efficacy of the program in 
promoting food security and alleviating health problems.  Children residing in households receiving food 
stamps are substantially more likely to suffer from an array of health-related problems than 
observationally similar nonparticipating children (e.g., Currie 2003; Coleman-Jensen et al. 2011). 
While SNAP is associated with adverse health- and nutrition-related outcomes, drawing 
inferences on the efficacy of the program is complicated by two fundamental identification problems.  A 
selection problem arises because the decision to participate in SNAP is unlikely to be exogenous.  To the 
contrary, unobserved factors such as expected future health status, parents’ human capital characteristics, 
financial stability, and attitudes towards work and family are all thought to be jointly related to 
participation in the program and health outcomes (Currie, 2003).  Families may decide to participate 
precisely because they expect to be food insecure or in poor health.   
A nonrandom measurement error problem arises because large fractions of food stamp recipients 
fail to report their program participation in household surveys.  Using administrative data matched with 
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), for example, Bollinger and David 
(1997) find that errors in self-reported receipt of food stamps exceed 12 percent and are related to 
respondents’ characteristics including their true participation status, health outcomes, and demographic 
attributes.  Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) provide evidence of extensive underreporting in the SIPP, 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).   
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While these identification problems have long been known to confound inferences on the impact 
of SNAP, credible solutions remain elusive.  In reviewing this literature, Currie (2003, p. 240) asserts that 
“many studies have […] simply ‘punted’ on the issue of identification.” Most studies treat selection as 
exogenous and receipt as accurate.  A few recent exceptions address the selection problem using 
instrumental variables within a linear response model (e.g., Gundersen and Oliveira 2001; DePolt, 
Moffitt, and Ribar 2009; Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009).  Gundersen and Kreider (2008) formally allow 
for the possibility of misclassified program participation, but they focus on identifying descriptive 
statistics rather than causal parameters.   
In this paper, we consider what can be inferred about impacts of SNAP when formally accounting 
for the ambiguity created by the selection and measurement error problems.  This study is the first to 
simultaneously address both of these treatment effect identification problems within a single 
methodological framework.  To do so, we extend recently developed partial identification methods that 
allow one to consider weaker assumptions than required under conventional parametric approaches (e.g., 
Manski 1995; Pepper 2000; Kreider and Pepper 2007 and 2008; Gundersen and Kreider 2008; Kreider 
and Hill 2009; and Molinari 2008 and 2010).  Introducing a nonparametric regression discontinuity 
design, Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2012) apply some of the methods developed in this paper to 
study effects of the National School Lunch Program.  Recent research in Nicoletti, Peracchi, and Foliano 
(2011) studies identification of marginal distributions (for poverty rates) using a framework that formally 
accounts for both classification errors and missing data.  
This partial identification approach is especially well-suited for studying the impact of SNAP 
where classical methodological prescriptions are often untenable.  The literature evaluating the impact of 
means-tested assistance programs typically relies on linear response models coupled with an assumption 
that some observed instrumental variable (IV), often based on cross-state and time variation in program 
rules and regulations, affects program participation but otherwise has no effect on the potential outcomes.  
Yet SNAP is mostly defined at the federal level and has not substantively changed since the early 1980s, 
so many of the key program rules and regulations are not as useful as instrumental variables.  Moreover, 
as is now widely recognized, the classical linear response model assumption is difficult to justify when 
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considering programs that are thought to have heterogeneous effects (Moffitt 2005).  Finally, the implicit 
assumption of accurate classification of participation status is known to be violated, yet addressing the 
problem of classification errors in a binary regressor is difficult.  The assumption of non-mean-reverting 
errors cannot apply with binary variables, and the systematic underreporting of SNAP participation 
violates the classical assumption that measurement error arises independently of the true value of the 
underlying variable (e.g., Bollinger 1996).   
The methods applied in this paper do not require the linear response model, the classical 
measurement error model, or an instrumental variable assumption.  Instead, we focus on weaker models 
that are straightforward to motivate in practice and result in informative bounds on the health 
consequences of SNAP.  In light of the methodological challenges in addressing these identification 
problems, deriving informative bounds under assumptions that may share some consensus seems like an 
important step.     
Using data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), we assess 
the impact of SNAP on the health of children, an important subpopulation that comprises half of all 
recipients and whose well-being is followed closely by policymakers and program administrators.  A 
primary strength of the NHANES is the wealth of health-related information provided in the survey.  We 
exploit these data by assessing the impact of SNAP on food insecurity, obesity, poor general health, and 
anemia.  In what follows, we use the terms “SNAP” and “food stamps” interchangeably since benefits 
were called food stamps during the years data were collected for our analysis.  
After describing the data in Section II, we formally define the empirical questions and the 
identification problems in Section III.  Our analysis is complicated by two distinct identification 
problems: (a) the selection problem that arises because the data cannot reveal unknown counterfactuals 
(e.g., the outcomes of a nonparticipant in an alternate state of the world in which SNAP benefits are 
received) and (b) the measurement error problem that arises because the data cannot reveal respondents 
with misclassified participation status.   
In Section IV, we focus on the selection problem, abstracting away from classification errors. 
Following Manski (1995) and Pepper (2000), we begin by examining what can be learned without 
 
5 
 
imposing any assumptions on the selection process, and then consider the identifying power of several 
alternative assumptions.  We first consider the Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS) restriction (Manski 
and Pepper 2000) that formalizes the common assumption that the decision to participate in SNAP is 
monotonically related to poor latent health outcomes.  We then consider the Monotone Instrumental 
Variable (MIV) assumption that the latent probability of a poor health outcome is nonincreasing in 
household income (adjusted for family composition).  Requiring no a priori exclusion restriction, the 
MIV assumption can be plausible in many applications where the standard independence assumption is a 
matter of considerable controversy.  Finally, in parts of the analysis, we consider a Monotone Treatment 
Response (MTR) assumption that participation in SNAP does not worsen health status.  While recipients 
appear to be worse off on average than eligible nonrecipients, many have argued that participating in 
SNAP would not cause health or food security to deteriorate (e.g., Currie 2003).  Section IV concludes 
with a brief analysis of data from the 2003 CPS to assess whether the results are consistent across the 
surveys and to consider standard instrumental variables made available in the rich CPS covariate data.   
In Section V, we introduce classification errors in the model.  In doing so, we make two notable 
contributions to the literature.  First, departing from the usual treatment effects literature that formally 
acknowledges ambiguity associated with counterfactuals but not ambiguity associated with misreporting, 
our methods simultaneously account for both problems.  Second, we develop new methods that utilize 
administrative information on the size of the NSLP caseload to derive informative constraints on the 
classification error problem.  
We draw conclusions in Section VI and emphasize three findings.  First, the ambiguity associated 
with the selection and classification error problems can be substantially mitigated by applying some basic 
restrictions including MTS and no-false positive reports of participation (as discussed below, the 
empirical literature on SNAP suggests that errors of commission are negligible).  Second, under the joint 
MIV-MTS assumption, we find that SNAP reduces food insecurity rates.  This result holds even for 
modest degrees of misclassification error.  Finally, under the joint MIV-MTS-MTR assumption, we find 
that SNAP leads to a decline in food insecurity rates and other poor health outcomes even when allowing 
for high rates of classification error. 
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II.   Data 
To study the impact of SNAP on child nutritional health, we use data from the 2001-2006 NHANES.  The 
NHANES, conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control 
(NCHS/CDC), is a program of surveys designed to collect information about the health and nutritional 
status of adults and children in the United States through interviews and direct physical examinations.  
The survey currently includes a national sample of about 5,000 persons each year, about half of whom are 
children.  Vulnerable groups, including Hispanics and African-Americans, are oversampled.  Given the 
wealth of health-related information, NHANES has been widely used in previous research on health- and 
nutrition-related child outcomes (recent work includes, e.g., Gundersen et al. 2008).   
We focus our analysis on households with children eligible to receive SNAP.  To be eligible for 
assistance during the time period of our study, a household’s gross income before taxes in the previous 
month cannot exceed 130 percent of the poverty line, net monthly income (gross income minus a standard 
deduction and expenses for care for disabled dependents, medical expenses, and excessive shelter costs) 
cannot exceed the poverty line, and assets must be less than $2,000.  Since the NHANES does not provide 
sufficient information to measure net income and assets, we focus on gross income eligibility.  Given our 
focus on children, however, this data limitation should not lead to substantial errors in defining eligibility 
(Gundersen and Offutt 2005).  In contrast, the asset test could be important for a sample that includes a 
high proportion of households headed by an elderly person (Haider, Jacknowitz, and Schoeni 2003).  
Virtually all gross income eligible households are also net income eligible. 
Our preliminary sample is comprised of 4690 children between the ages of two and 17 who reside 
in households with income less than 130% of the federal poverty line.  Children under the age of two are 
not included in the sample because there is no commonly accepted way to establish BMI percentiles for 
children this young.  After dropping additional observations for which information is missing about 
height and weight, we obtain our final sample of 4,418 income-eligible children.     
For each observation, we observe a number of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
including the ratio of income to the poverty line.  Our sample has an average household income level 
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equal to 75 percent of the poverty line.  To assess the characteristics of our sample relative to other 
national estimates, we examined data from the 2003 CPS, December Supplement (see Section IV.D for 
further details).  These data also indicate that income eligible children lived in families with average 
income equal to 75 percent of the poverty line. 
 
A.  Self-Reported SNAP Receipt Indicator 
Beyond demographic information, we also observe a self-reported measure of SNAP receipt over 
the past year.  SNAP participants receive benefits for the purchase of food in authorized retail food outlets 
where the benefit amount depends on net income.  Households with a net income of zero receive the 
maximum benefit, and benefits decline with income: for every additional dollar, the amount of SNAP 
benefits is reduced by 30 cents (except earned income, in which case the reduction is 24 cents).  In 2010, 
the average monthly benefit was $288/month for a family of four, with a maximum benefit of $668.  
These benefits can represent a substantial component of low-income households’ total income.  
In this survey, only 46% of the households classified as eligible for benefits claim to be 
participating in the program.  In part, this might reflect errors in classifying eligibility status: some 
respondents classified as eligible may, in fact, be ineligible (Gundersen et. al., 2012, address this 
classification error problem in their evaluation of the National School Lunch Program).  Even with 
classification errors, however, a large fraction of eligible households do not participate in SNAP. This 
nonparticipation is ascribed to four main factors.  First, there may be stigma associated with receiving 
SNAP.  Stigma encompasses a wide variety of sources, including a person’s own distaste for 
participation, fear of disapproval from others when redeeming food stamps, and the possible negative 
reaction of caseworkers (Moffitt 1983).  Second, transaction costs can diminish the attractiveness of 
participation.  To receive SNAP, households must personally verify their income and expenses and must 
visit a caseworker on a periodic basis to recertify their eligibility.  The initial visit and subsequent 
recertifications can be time consuming.  Third, the benefit level can be quite small for relatively higher 
income families – sometimes as low as $10 a month.  
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Finally, SNAP receipt is thought to be underreported.  Evidence of pervasive underreporting has 
surfaced in two types of studies, both of which compare self-reported information with official records.  
The first type has compared aggregate statistics obtained from self-reported survey data with those 
obtained from administrative data.  These studies suggest the presence of substantial underreporting  in 
many different surveys including the CPS, the SIPP, the PSID, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CES) (Trippe, Doyle, and Asher 1992; Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 2003; and Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 
2009).  Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009, Table 13), for example, find that self-reports in the CPS reflect 
just over half the number of food stamp recipients identified in administrative data.  Other studies have 
compared individual reports of food stamp participation status in surveys with matched reports from 
administrative data.  Using this method, researchers can identify both errors of commission (reporting 
benefits not actually received) and errors of omission (not reporting benefits actually received).  As 
discussed above, Bollinger and David (1997, Table 2) find that 12.0 percent of responses in the SIPP 
involve errors of omission while only 0.3 percent involve errors of commission (see also Marquis and 
Moore, 1990).    
 
B.  Outcomes 
A primary strength of the NHANES is the detailed information provided on dietary and health-
related outcomes, with distinct components of the survey providing information from self-reports, 
medical examinations, physiological measurements, and laboratory tests.  Since no single measure is 
thought to completely capture health and nutritional well-being, the detailed and varied health measures 
available in the NHANES make it a unique and important survey for studying the impact of nutritional 
programs on well-being.     
Because alleviating food insecurity is the central goal of SNAP (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
1999), much of our attention focuses on this measure of nutritional health.  The extent of food insecurity 
in the United States has become a well-publicized issue of concern to policymakers and program 
administrators.  In 2010, 14.5% of the U.S. population reported that they suffered from food insecurity at 
some time during the previous year (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2011).  These households were uncertain of 
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having, or unable to acquire, enough food for all their members because they had insufficient money or 
other resources.   
To calculate these official food insecurity rates in the U.S., defined over a 12 month period, a 
series of 18 questions are posed in the Core Food Security Module (CFSM) for families with children.  
(For families without children, a subset of 10 of these 18 questions are posed.)  Each question is designed 
to capture some aspect of food insecurity and, for some questions, the frequency with which it manifests 
itself.  Examples include “I worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more” 
(the least severe outcome); “Did you or the other adults in your household ever cut the size of your meals 
or skip meals because there wasn't enough money for food?” and “Did a child in the household ever not 
eat for a full day because you couldn't afford enough food?” (the most severe outcome).  A complete 
listing of the food insecurity questions is presented in Appendix Table 1.  Following official definitions, 
we use these 18 questions to construct a comparison of children in food secure households (two or fewer 
affirmative responses) with children in food insecure households (three or more affirmative responses).  
In addition to studying the impact of SNAP on food insecurity rates, we also examine three other 
outcome variables: obesity, anemia, and an indicator of fair or poor general health.  Based on guidelines 
provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a child is classified as obese if his or her 
body mass index (BMI) (kg/m²) is at or above the 95th percentile for the child’s age and gender.  In the 
NHANES, heights and weights used to calculate BMI are obtained by trained personnel (i.e., not self-
reported).  A child is classified as having anemia if, based on a blood test, the child is both iron deficient 
and has an abnormally low hemoglobin level.  The indicator of fair or poor general health is reported by 
the child’s parent.  In this paper, we treat these health outcomes as accurately measured.  While errors in 
measuring obesity and anemia are likely to be minimal (data on height and weight were collected by 
trained personnel and anemia is measured using a blood test), this assumption may be violated for the 
general health and food insecurity outcomes.  In general, measurement error in the outcome variables 
would widen the bounds established in this paper. 
Together, these four measures reflect a wide range of health related outcomes that might be 
impacted by SNAP.  All four outcomes are also known to be associated with a range of negative physical, 
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psychological, and social consequences that have current and future implications for health, including 
reduced life expectancy.  With a maximum pair-wise correlation of only 0.12 (between food insecurity 
and poor general health), these four outcomes are related but clearly measure different aspects of well-
being.  The outcomes have also attracted different levels of attention in the existing food stamp literature.  
Food insecurity and obesity are of central concern to policymakers and researchers studying the impact of 
SNAP on health (e.g., Kaushal 2007; Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk 2008).  To the best of our knowledge, 
this paper is the first to investigate (using any methods) the impacts of SNAP on self-reported general 
health and anemia.  
Table 1 displays means and standard errors for the variables used in this study.  The estimates in 
this table (and elsewhere in the paper) are weighted to account for the complex survey design used in the 
NHANES.  Consistent with previous work on this topic, SNAP recipients tend to have worse health 
outcomes than eligible nonparticipants.  For example, 45% of children reported as SNAP recipients are 
food insecure, nine percentage points higher than the 36% food insecurity rate among eligible 
nonparticipants (a statistically significant difference at better than the 5% level).  Compared with eligible 
nonrecipients, SNAP recipients are also slightly more likely to be obese, be in fair or poor general health, 
and have anemia.   
 
III.   Identifying the Average Treatment Effect 
Our interest is in learning about the average treatment effect (ATE) of SNAP receipt on each of 
our health-related outcomes among food stamp eligible households. Focusing on binary outcomes, the 
ATE is given by 
 
ATE(1,0 | ) [ (1) 1| ] [ (0) 1| ]X P H X P H X          (1) 
  
where H is the realized health outcome, H(1) denotes the health of a child if he or she were to receive 
food stamps, H(0) denotes the analogous outcome if the child were not to receive food stamps, and 
X   denotes conditioning on observed covariates whose values lie in the set  . Thus, the average 
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treatment effect reveals how the mean outcome would differ if all eligible children received food stamps 
versus the mean outcome if all eligible children did not receive food stamps.  In our analysis, H = 1 
denotes a poor health outcome with H = 0 otherwise. 
 In what follows, we simplify the notation by suppressing the conditioning on subpopulations of 
interest captured in X.  For this analysis, we focus on eligible children.  In much of the literature 
examining the impact of SNAP, other observed covariates are motivated as a means of controlling for 
factors influencing a family’s participation decision.  In the usual regression framework, researchers 
attempt to “correctly” choose a set of control variables for which the exogenous selection assumption 
applies.  Inevitably, however, there is much debate about whether the researcher omitted “important” 
explanatory variables.  In contrast, conditioning on covariates in our approach serves only to define 
subpopulations of interest as there are no regression orthogonality conditions to be satisfied.  The problem 
is well-defined regardless of how the subpopulations are specified (Pepper 2000).   
 As discussed above, two identification problems arise when assessing the impact of SNAP on 
children’s health outcomes.  First, even if participation were observed for all eligible households, the 
potential outcome H(1) is counterfactual for all children who did not receive food stamps, while H(0) is 
counterfactual for all children who did receive food stamps.  This is referred to as the selection problem.  
Using the Law of Total Probability, this identification problem can be highlighted by writing the first 
term of Equation (1) as  
 
* * * *[ (1) 1] [ (1) 1| 1] ( 1) [ (1) 1| 0] ( 0)P H P H FS P FS P H FS P FS              (2) 
 
where FS* =1 denotes that a child is in a household that truly receives food stamps and FS*=0 otherwise. 
If food stamp receipt is observed, the sampling process identifies the selection probability, *( 1)P FS  , the 
probability an eligible child does not receive food stamps, *( 0),P FS   and the expectation of outcomes 
conditional on the outcome being observed, 
* *[ (1) 1| 1] ( 1| 1).P H FS P H FS      Still, the sampling 
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process cannot reveal the mean outcome conditional on the outcome being counterfactual,
*[ (1) 1| 0]P H FS  .  Thus, [ (1) 1]P H   is not point-identified by the sampling process alone.   
 Second, true participation status may not be observed for respondents.  This is referred to as the 
measurement or classification error problem.  Instead of observing FS*, we observe a self-reported 
indictor, FS, where FS = 1 if a child is in a household that reports receiving food stamps and 0 otherwise.  
Without assumptions restricting the nature or degree of classification errors, the sampling process does 
not reveal useful information on food stamp receipt, FS*, and thus all of the probabilities on the right hand 
side of Equation (2) are unknown.    
 To highlight this measurement problem, let the latent variable Z* indicate whether a report is 
accurate, where Z* =1 if FS*= FS and Z*= 0 otherwise.  Using this variable, we can further decompose the 
first term of Equation (1) as  
*
1 1
*
1 0 1 0
[ (1) 1] [ (1) 1, 1] (3)
[ (1) 1| 0][ ( 0) ( ) ( )],  
P H P H FS
P H FS P FS
 
   
 
   
     
         
where * *( , 1, 0) and ( , 0, 0)j jP H j FS Z P H j FS Z          denote the fraction of false positive 
and false negative classifications of food stamp recipients, respectively, for children realizing health 
outcome j = 1, 0.  The first part of Equation (2), * *[ (1) 1| 1] ( 1)P H FS P FS   , is not identified because 
of the classification error problem.  The second part of Equation (2) is not identified because of both the 
selection and classification error problems.  As above, the data cannot reveal the counterfactual outcome 
distribution, *[ (1) 1| 0]P H FS  , regardless of whether participation is measured accurately, and, in the 
presence of classification errors, the sampling process does not reveal the proportion of respondents that 
received assistance, 
*( 1)P FS  .
 
 
IV.   The Selection Problem  
 The literature evaluating the effect of SNAP on health has implicitly assumed that respondents 
accurately self-report of program participation.  To provide a direct comparison to the existing literature, 
we begin by focusing on this special case and study what can be learned about the average treatment 
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effect using existing methods.  In Section V below, we develop new methods for simultaneously 
addressing the selection and classification error problems.   
 A natural starting point is to ask what can be learned in the absence of any assumptions invoked 
to address the selection problem (see Manski, 1995 and Pepper, 2000).  Since the latent probability 
*[ (1) 1| 0]P H FS   must lie within [0,1], it follows that  
 
* * *( 1, 1) [ (1) 1] ( 1, 1) ( 0)                                  (4)P H FS P H P H FS P FS          
 
where, in the absence of classification errors, the lower and upper bounds are identified by the sampling 
process.  An analogous result applies for [ (0) 1]P H  .  In this worst-case scenario where there is no 
additional identifying information, the data alone cannot reveal whether SNAP leads to better or worse 
mean health outcomes (see Manski, 1995, for further details).  
 
A.  Monotone Instrumental Variable Models 
 To derive more informative inferences about the impact of SNAP on health, prior information to 
address the selection problem must be brought to bear.  While the exogenous selection assumption 
*[ (1) 1] [ (1) 1| ]P H P H FS    maintained in much of the literature seems untenable, there are a number 
of middle ground assumptions that narrow the bounds by restricting the relationship between SNAP 
participation, health outcomes, and observed covariates.  In this section we apply two Monotone 
Instrumental Variable (MIV) assumptions that certain observed covariates are known to be monotonically 
related to the latent response variable.  
First, we consider the Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS) assumption (Manski and Pepper 
2000) that children receiving food stamps are likely to have worse latent health outcomes on average than 
nonparticipants.  Monotone Treatment Selection is a special case of MIV in which the treatment itself is a 
monotone instrument.  This selection model formalizes the most common explanation for the positive 
association between participation and poor health: unobserved factors associated with poor health are 
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thought to be positively associated with the decision to participate (e.g., Gundersen and Oliveira 2001; 
Currie 2003).  For example, families may participate precisely because they expect to be food insecure.  
Formally, the MTS assumption is given by 
 
* *[ ( ) 1| 0] [ ( ) 1| 1]   for 0,1.                                     (5)P H j FS P H j FS j       
  
That is, for latent potential outcomes H(0) and H(1), eligible households that receive food stamps, FS*=1, 
have no better latent health outcomes on average than eligible households that do not receive food stamps, 
FS* = 0.  While the MTS assumption serves to reduce the upper bound on the ATE, the assumption alone 
does not identify the sign of the average treatment effect (see Manski and Pepper 2000).  
Second, we consider the relatively innocuous assumption that the latent probability of negative 
health outcomes weakly decreases with income adjusted for family composition.  A large body of 
empirical research supports the idea of a negative gradient between reported income and the health 
outcomes studied in this paper (e.g., Coleman-Jensen et al. (2011) for food insecurity; Case, Lubotsky, 
and Paxson (2002), and Deaton (2002) for general health; Newacheck (1994) for anemia; and Shrewsbury 
and Wardle (2008), and Jolliffe (2011) for obesity).  To formalize this idea, let v be the monotone 
instrumental variable such that  
 
1 2 2 1  implies [ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1| ] for 1,0.        (6)u u u P H t v u P H t v u P H t v u t             
 
These conditional probabilities can be bounded using the various nonparametric models described 
throughout this paper.  Let LB(u) and UB(u) be the known lower and upper bounds evaluated at v = u, 
respectively, given the available information.  Then the MIV assumption formalized in Manski and 
Pepper (2000, Proposition 1) implies: 
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Bounds on the unconditional latent probability, P[H(t) =1], can then be obtained using the law of total 
probability.  
 Following the approach developed in Kreider and Pepper (2007), we estimate these MIV bounds 
by first dividing the sample into equally sized groups (more than 200 observations per cell) delineated by 
an increasing ratio of income to the poverty line.  Then, to find the MIV bounds on the rates of poor 
health outcomes, one takes the average of the plug-in estimators (weighted to account for the survey 
design) of lower and upper bounds across the different income groups observed in the data.  We use 20 
groups, although the qualitative results in this paper are unchanged when we use 15 or 25 income groups.  
Since this MIV estimator is consistent but biased in finite samples (see Manski and Pepper, 2000 and 
2009), we employ Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) modified MIV estimator that accounts for the finite 
sample bias using a nonparametric bootstrap correction method.  Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009) 
formalize an entirely different approach for estimation, inference, and bias correction that involves 
applying a precision correction to their estimated boundary functions before taking the intersections. In 
the context of monotone instrumental variables, their approach is designed to estimate the expected 
response functions conditional on a particular value of the instrumental variable (see Proposition1 in 
Manski and Pepper, 2000), but not the unconditional mean response function (see Corollary 1 in Manski 
and Pepper, 2000) that is the focus of this paper.  Recent work by Hirano and Porter (forthcoming) raises 
some concerns about applying bias corrections when estimating intersection bounds, showing that it may 
be impossible to completely eliminate bias and that reducing bias too much leads to large increases in 
variance.  With more than 200 observations per cell, however, the bias correction in our application plays 
a relatively modest role in our estimates (see tables below).   
 
B.  Results for the no errors case    
For each of the four outcomes, Table 2 presents bias-corrected bounds, confidence intervals, and 
estimated finite-sample biases under a variety of different models for the no errors case.  In the first row, 
we make no assumptions about how eligible households select into the program.  The width of the ATE 
bounds always equals 1, and the bounds on the ATE always include zero (see Manski, 1995).  These wide 
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bounds highlight a researcher’s inability to make strong inferences about the efficacy of the food stamps 
without making assumptions that address the problem of unknown counterfactuals.  In the absence of 
restrictions that address the selection problem, we cannot rule out the possibility that SNAP has a large 
positive or negative impact on the likelihood on poor health outcomes.  These bounds can be narrowed 
substantially, however, under common monotonicity assumptions on treatment selection (MTS) and 
relationships between the latent outcome and observed instrumental variables (MIV).   
To narrow the bounds, we apply the MTS and joint MTS-MIV assumptions.  These results are 
presented in the middle two rows of Table 2, respectively.  The MTS assumption alone is not strong 
enough to identify the sign of the impact of SNAP on the health outcomes, but it does dramatically reduce 
the upper bounds on the average treatment effects.  For example, the upper bound for food insecurity falls 
from 0.555 to 0.093 such that ATE [-0.445, 0.093] .  The upper bounds on the other three outcomes drop 
even further, falling to 0.015 for poor health, 0.012 for obesity, and 0.003 for anemia.  Thus, under the 
MTS assumption alone, the estimated bounds rule out the possibility that SNAP leads to large increases in 
poor health, obesity and anemia.  Instead, SNAP may lead to substantial reductions in these adverse 
health outcomes and, at worst, have slightly deleterious effects.  
Perhaps the most important results are found when we combine the MTS assumption with the 
MIV assumption that the probability of poor health weakly decreases with family resources, as measured 
by the ratio of income to the poverty line.  The upper bound is negative for all four outcomes in this joint 
MTS-MIV model, though the confidence interval includes zero for obesity and anemia.  For example, the 
estimates suggest that SNAP reduces the prevalence of food insecurity by at least 12.8 points and poor 
health by 6.1 points.  These numbers suggest that food stamps have substantial beneficial effects.  In the 
absence of SNAP, our estimates of P[H(0)=1] indicate that at least 45.9 percent of eligible children would 
be food insecure and 11.2 percent would be in poor health.  Thus, the estimates indicate that the program 
has reduced the prevalence of food insecurity by at least 28% (= 12.8/45.9) and poor health by at least 
54% (=6.1/11.2). 
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C.  Monotone Treatment Response Model 
 Despite the observed positive correlations in the data between SNAP participation and 
unfavorable outcomes, there is a general consensus among policymakers and researchers that SNAP does 
not increase the rate of food insecurity (Currie, 2003).  Given this general consensus, we consider the 
identifying power of the Monotone Treatment Response (MTR) assumption (Manski, 1995 and 1997; 
Pepper 2000) that formalizes the common idea that SNAP does not lead to a reduction in health status: 
(1) (0)H H .  In this case, the average treatment effect of receiving food stamps must be nonpositive.   
 Since MTR rules out the possibility of deleterious effects of food stamps on health by 
assumption, it is not helpful in resolving the health outcomes paradox.  Nevertheless, for outcomes in 
which MTR is thought to be credible, it can help shed light on the magnitudes of any identified beneficial 
effects of the program.  In particular, MTR may interact with the MTS and MIV assumptions to bound 
the ATE further away from zero than can be attained under the MTS-MIV assumptions alone.  
 For the food insecurity, general health, and anemia outcomes, the MTR assumption seems 
relatively innocuous in that it is difficult to imagine how receiving food stamps would lead to worse 
health outcomes.  Previous work has demonstrated that each additional dollar in benefits leads to marginal 
increases in food expenditures (e.g., Breunig and Dasgupta 2002; Levedahl 1995).  If food is a normal 
good, SNAP should weakly increase the consumption of food and, in turn, decrease the incidence of food 
insecurity, poor or fair health, and anemia.  For obesity, however, the assumption is more tenuous.  Better 
access to nutritious foods through SNAP may lead to healthier eating and less obesity, but potential 
increases in caloric intake could result in weight gains.   
 The bottom rows of Table 2 present results under the joint MTS-MIV-MTR assumption.  While 
the MTR assumption is less credible for obesity than for the other outcomes, we present MTS-MIV-MTR 
estimates for each outcome to make transparent the identifying power of the MTR assumption in each 
case.  Without measurement error, the MTR assumption does not notably reduce the estimated upper 
bounds on the ATE relative to the estimates derived under the MTS-MIV assumptions alone.  With 
classification errors (see Section V), however, the MTR assumption turns out to have substantial 
identifying power in this application.  
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D. Sensitivity Analysis Using Data from the CPS 
To assess the sensitivity of our findings to the data source, we estimate these models using 
analogous data from the December Supplement of the 2003 CPS.  The CPS has been widely applied to 
evaluate the association between SNAP and food insecurity (e.g., Jensen 2002; Wilde and Nord 2005; 
Gundersen and Kreider 2008), and is used by the USDA to establish the official food insecurity rates for 
the United States (e.g., Coleman-Jensen et al., 2011).   
Using the sampling design in Gundersen and Kreider (2008), our data for this sensitivity analysis 
includes 2,707 households with children reporting incomes less than 130 percent of the poverty line.  As 
with the NHANES, we observe a self-reported measure of food stamp receipt over the past year, food 
insecurity over the past year, and the ratio of income to the poverty line.  The CPS does not include 
information on the other three outcomes (poor general health, obesity, and anemia) revealed in the 
NHANES data.  The summary statistics from the CPS data are similar to what we find in the NHAMES 
(see Table 2 in Gundersen and Kreider 2008):  just over 40% of the households report receiving food 
stamps, and the food insecurity rate among self-report recipients is 17.9 percentage points higher than 
among eligible nonrecipients (52.3% versus 34.4%).   
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents estimates using the CPS data.  The estimates are similar to 
what we find using data from the NHANES, although the estimated upper bound under the MIV-MTS 
model is positive.  The estimated upper bound remains negative, however, when we impose the MIV-
MTS-MTR assumption.  In part, differences in estimates reflect the smaller sample size in the CPS data 
which leads to less precise estimates and larger bias corrections in the MIV models.  Differences may also 
reflect the fact that classification errors in the CPS have been found to be more extensive than in the 
NHANES (Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2009).  
Although these data have very limited information on health outcomes compared with the 
NHANES, they are rich enough to allow us to construct some standard instrumental variables for SNAP 
participation used in the existing literature.  In particular, state identifiers in the CPS allow us to apply a 
more traditional instrumental variable (IV) assumption based on cross-state variation in program 
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eligibility rules.  To do so, we merge the Urban Institute’s database of state program rules (see Finegold, 
Margrabe, and Ratcliffe 2006) with the CPS data to create two instrumental variables: an indicator for 
whether the state uses a simplified semi-annual reporting requirement for earnings (47%) and an indicator 
for whether cars are exempt from the asset test (30%).  Suppose these two variables have no impact on the 
expected food insecurity status except indirectly through SNAP participation. When combined with the 
traditional linear response model, the ATE is point identified and the Wald estimator of the average 
treatment effect ranges from -0.23 (when the indicator for whether cars count in the asset test is used as an 
IV) to -0.62 (when the indicator for whether the state uses a simplified reporting requirement is used as an 
IV).   
Notice that the -0.62 estimate lies outside of the worst-case bounds reported in Table 2, 
suggesting that either the IV assumption or the linear response model assumption is invalid.  If instead of 
applying the linear response model we estimate Shaikh and Vytlacil’s (2011) nonparametric threshold 
crossing model, SNAP is found to reduce food insecurity by at least 3 percentage points when using the 
asset test instrument and at least 5 points when using the reporting requirement instrument.  The estimate 
based on the reporting requirement instrument is significantly different than zero at the five-percent level, 
but the asset test instrument is not statistically significantly different than zero.  
Combining these traditional instruments with sufficiently strong assumptions reveals consistent 
evidence that SNAP reduces the rate of food insecurity.  Yet while these estimated negative average 
treatment effects are qualitatively similar to our primary results found using the MIV and MTS 
assumptions, we caution against drawing strong conclusions on the efficacy of SNAP based on these 
findings alone.  In particular, there may be good reasons to doubt the excludability assumption that the 
instruments are mean independent of the latent food insecurity outcome.  State-specific food insecurity 
rates are well documented (e.g. Coleman-Jensen et al. 2011), and states may choose SNAP rules and 
regulations within USDA guidelines partially in response to food insecurity levels.  Thus, these state 
program rules may not be independent of the state food insecurity rate.  Finally, while the Shaikh and 
Vytlacil threshold-crossing model provides a constructive middle-ground model that allows one to 
impose some additional structure, the linear response model imposes the strong homogeneity restriction 
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on the response function that seems unlikely to hold in practice.  The finding that one of the linear IV 
estimates lies outside of the worst case bounds suggests that this assumption may be violated.  
 
V.  The Selection and Classification Error Model: A Unified Approach 
While our findings thus far imply that SNAP plays an important role in improving children’s 
health, we have not yet accounted for classification errors.  In this section, we introduce new methods that 
explicitly acknowledge the presence of SNAP reporting errors and incorporate auxiliary administrative 
data on the size of the SNAP caseload to restrict the magnitudes and patterns of such errors. 
With classification errors, FS* is not observed and the Manski (1995) worst-case selection bounds 
are not identified.  In particular, defining  Θ ≡ ሺߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ାሻ െ ሺߠ଴ି ൅ߠଵାሻ, we augment the Manski bounds 
as follows: 
 
   ሾെܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ െ ܲሺܪ ൌ 0, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻሿ ൅ Θ  
             ൑ ܣܶܧሺ1,0ሻ ൑           (7) 
   ሾܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ ൅ ܲሺܪ ൌ 0, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻሿ ൅ Θ. 
 
Thus, without restrictions on the measurement error process, the false reporting rates ߠ are not identified, 
and the data are uninformative about the ATE.  We use two sources of information to restrict Θ.  First, 
auxiliary data on size of the SNAP caseload provides informative restrictions on the classification error 
components, ߠ.  Second, the relevant validation literature provides informative restrictions on the 
magnitude and patterns of the classification error problem.   
 
A.  The Classification Error Model 
To draw inferences in light of the classification error problem, we exploit two sources of 
additional information.  First, we combine readily available auxiliary data on the size of the caseload from 
the administrative data collected by the USDA with survey data from the NHANES to estimate the true 
participation rate, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ.  In Proposition 1 below, we show how knowledge of the true and the self-
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reported rates implies meaningful restrictions on the classification error probabilities, ߠ.  In particular, 
knowledge of ܲ∗ ≡ ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ and ܲ ≡ ܲሺܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ implies the following three restrictions: 
               ሺߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ି ሻ െ ሺߠଵା൅ߠ଴ାሻ ൌ Δ          (8a) 
   ߠ௜ି ൑ minሼܲሺܪ ൌ ݅, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻሽ ≡ ߠ௜௎஻ି ,   ݅ ൌ 1, 0      (8b)   
               ߠ௜ା ൑ minሼܲሺܪ ൌ ݅, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 0ሻሽ ≡ ߠ௜௎஻ା,   ݅ ൌ 1, 0      (8c) 
 
where Δ ≡ ܲ∗ െ ܲ.  Equation (8a) restricts the net fraction of false negative reports to equal the difference 
in the true and self-reported participation rates.  Equations (8b) and (8c) place meaningful upper bounds 
on the fraction of false negative and positive reports.    
 Second, the range of studies examining the validity of self-reports provide additional information 
on the degree of misreporting.  As discussed above, evidence from validation studies find errors of 
commission to be negligible, with the overall rate of misreporting estimated to be no greater than about 25 
percent.  To incorporate information on the overall rate of misreporting, we consider the identifying 
power of a restriction on the maximum amount of data corruption in the spirit of Horowitz and Manski 
(1995).  That is, let   
  P(Z* = 0) ≤ Qu      (9)  
where Qu is a known upper bound on the degree of SNAP misclassification.  Given knowledge of P*, this 
value must logically lie within the range ሾ|ܲ∗ െ ܲ|, 1ሿ.  In the polar case that Qu is set equal to 1, the 
researcher is setting no restriction on the proportion of false reports in the data beyond that implied by 
restrictions (8a)-(8c).  We refer to this as the “arbitrary errors model.”  In the other polar case that Qu is 
set equal to |ܲ∗ െ ܲ|, the researcher is imposing a “no excess errors” restriction that there are no data 
errors beyond the proportion necessary to generate the discrepancy (distance) between the true 
participation rate, P*, and reported rate, P.  For the case of systematic underreporting in our application, 
Δ ൒ 0, setting Qu equal to its minimum allowed value |ܲ∗ െ ܲ| is equivalent to imposing a “no false 
positives” assumption that respondents do not falsely claim to participate in the program (and similarly a 
“no false negatives” assumption in applications involving Δ ൑ 0ሻ.  The no false positives assumption 
serves as a useful benchmark for the receipt of SNAP in our application since validation data suggest very 
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few instances of households falsely claiming to receive food stamps (e.g., Bollinger and David 1997; 
Marquis and Moore 1990).  Middle-ground positions are obtained by setting Qu between |ܲ∗ െ ܲ| and 1.    
The restrictions in Equations (8) and (9) imply informative bounds on the unknown parameter, Θ, 
where the upper bound is found by maximizing ሺߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ାሻ and minimizing ሺߠ଴ି ൅ߠଵାሻ, and vice versa for 
the lower bound.  In particular, we derive the following bounds on Θ:  
 
Proposition 1: Given restrictions (8a)-(8c) and (9),  
 Θ  ∈ ሾ݉ܽݔሼെܳ௨,െ2ߠଵ௎஻ା െ  ߂, െ2ߠ଴௎஻ି ൅  ߂ሽ ,݉݅݊ሼܳ௨, 2ߠଵ௎஻ି െ ߂, 2ߠ଴௎஻ା ൅ ߂ሽሿ. 
      
See Appendix B for a proof of this result.   
 Using this proposition, we can directly bound the average treatment effect when there are 
classification errors.  In particular, bounds on the ATE follow directly by combining the Proposition 1 
bound on  with Equation (7).  Notice that allowing for ambiguity created by the reporting error problem 
(weakly) widens the treatment effect bounds.  At the same time, Θ might be bounded to lie in a strictly 
positive or negative range.  Thus, the upper bound on the ATE can decrease, or the lower bound increase, 
even as the overall width of the ATE bound expands.  Applying Proposition 1 above to evaluate the 
impacts of the National School Lunch Program, Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2012) provide an 
example in which it is easier to identify the sign of their ATE of interest in the presence of classification 
errors (when the error patterns are constrained as described above) than under the standard implicit 
assumption of perfectly measured data.    
Additional analysis is required to address the classification error problem under the MTS 
assumption.  Under this assumption, the upper bound on the ATE can be written as the difference of 
conditional means: 
ܣܶܧሺ1,0ሻ ൑ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1|ܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1|ܨܵ∗ ൌ 0ሻ. 
 
In the absence of classification errors, this upper bound is simply the difference in the observed poor 
health rate among recipients and nonrecipients.  With classification errors, we can write 
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             ܣܶܧሺ1,0ሻ ൑    ௉ሺுୀଵ,ிௌୀଵሻାఏభషିఏభశ௉ሺிௌ∗ୀଵሻ െ
௉ሺுୀଵ,ிௌୀ଴ሻାఏభశିఏభష
௉ሺிௌ∗ୀ଴ሻ ,     (10) 
 
where information on the true participation rate, P(FS* = 1), implies bounds on these conditional 
probabilities.  In particular, we can narrow the Proposition 1 bounds as follows: 
Proposition 2: Given the MTS assumption in Equation (5) and the classification error model restrictions 
in Equations (8) and (9), it follows that  
 
ܣܶܧሺ1,0ሻ                                                                                                                                                            
൑
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ܲሺܪ ൌ 0ሻܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 0ሻ                                                                                if  0 ൏ ܲሺܨܵ
∗ ൌ 1ሻ ൏ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ
ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ ൅ ߠଵ௎஻ି∗
ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ െ
ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ െ ߠଵ௎஻ି∗
ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 0ሻ      if  ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ ൑ ܲሺܨܵ
∗ ൌ 1ሻ ൏ 1
 
where *1  ≡݉݅݊ሼܳ௨, ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻሽ.   
See Appendix B for a proof this result.  
Except for the true participation rate, ܲ∗ ൌ ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ, all of the probabilities in Propositions 1 
and 2 can be consistently estimated using data from the NHANES.  To infer ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ, we combine 
auxiliary data on the size of the caseload with data from the NHANES on the size of the eligible 
population.  Administrative data from the USDA reveals that from 2001-2006 there was an average of 
nearly 11 million children receiving food stamps per year (calculated using annual reports from Rosso 
2002; Genser 2003; Cunnyngham and Brown 2004; Poikolainen 2005; Barrett 2006; and Wolkwitz 
2007).  From the NHANES, we estimate that 22 million children were eligible to receive assistance.  
Thus, the implied participation rate is about 0.50, 4 points higher than the reported rate of 0.456.  We note 
that a net false negative reporting rate of 4% is consistent with the results Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 
(2009) when evaluating misreporting the SIPP, but much smaller than found in the CPS and PSID.  Using 
the CPS, for example, the participation rate is estimated to be around 70% (Cunnyngham 2005).  Given 
this variability in the estimated participation rates and the possibility that errors in classifying eligible 
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children may bias the estimated participation rates, we assess the sensitivity of the bounds to variation in 
the true participation rate.    
 
B. Results 
Our analytical approach allows us to trace out sharp bounds on the ATE under different 
assumptions about selection and measurement error.  To do so, we evaluate the bounds as a function of 
the unknown SNAP participation rate, P*, under various assumptions about the selection process.  By 
layering successively stronger assumptions, our analysis reveals how the strength of the conclusions 
varies with the strength of the identifying assumptions.  We begin in Section B.1 by focusing on bounding 
the impact of SNAP participation on food insecurity.  We then extend the discussion to the three other 
health outcomes in Section B.2.   
 
B.1.  Food Insecurity  
Figure 1 traces out the estimated Proposition 1 and 2 bounds – that is, the worst-case and MTS 
bounds – for the ATE on the food insecurity rate across all values of P* between 0 and 1.  The 
accompanying table highlights these results for P* equal to (a) the NHANES self-reported participation 
rate of P = 0.456, (b) our preferred estimated true participation rate of 0.50 based on administrative data 
from the USDA, and (c) a higher rate of 0.70 chosen to be consistent with the participation rate found 
using the CPS (Cunnyngham 2005).  The solid lines in the figures trace out the estimated arbitrary error 
bounds (i.e., ܳ௨ ൌ 1) in which there are no restrictions imposed on the nature or degree of errors except 
those implied by the knowledge of P and P* as captured by Equations (8a)-(8c).  The dashed lines display 
the estimated bounds under the further restriction of no excess errors: ܳ௨ ൌ |ܲ∗ െ ܲ|.  Recall that for the 
underreporting cases (the most relevant cases in our application) in which P* lies to the right of P = 0.456, 
this no excess error model is equivalent to no false positive reports.  The table also provides Imbens-
Manski (2004) confidence intervals that cover the true value of the ATE with 90% probability.   
As noted above, the worst-case bounds on the ATE if SNAP receipt is accurately reported (P* = P 
and no excess errors) have a width of one and always include zero.  For food insecurity, these worst-case 
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no errors bounds are [-0.445, 0.555] as depicted in the figure by the solid vertical line at P* = P (see also 
Table 2).  Allowing for classification errors notably increases the width of these bounds.  For example, 
suppose the true participation rate remains equal to the self-reported rate of 0.456, but now one only 
imposes the assumption of no net reporting errors such that the rate of false positives equals the rate of 
false negatives.  Then, as shown in Figure 1 and the accompanying table, the ATE bounds on the food 
insecurity rate expand from [-0.445, 0.555] to [-0.855, 0.944], with a width of 1.799.  If the true 
participation rate is 0.50 (the rate consistent with the USDA administrative data) instead of 0.456, the 
bounds change to [-0.900, 0.900] with a width of 1.800.  These findings reveal the important negative 
result that the ambiguity created by classification errors can be substantial even if the true and self-
reported rates are similar.  
The upper bounds when P* is near P, however, are markedly reduced by introducing the MTS 
assumption, especially when combined with the no excess errors assumption (no false-positives when 
ܲ∗ ൒ ܲ).  With P* = 0.50, for example, the no false positives bounds are [-0.489, 0.599], with a width of 
1.088.  Adding the MTS assumption further reduces the upper bound to 0.198.  Thus, the no false 
positives assumption decreases the ambiguity associated with measurement error from 1.800 to 1.088, a 
40% reduction, and the MTS assumption further reduces the width of the bound to 0.687, more than 60% 
narrower than the width of the worth-case bounds when P* = 0.50.  While these two assumptions have 
substantial identifying power in this application, these wide bounds presented in Figure 1 highlight the 
difficulty of making strong inferences in light of the selection and measurement error problems.  In the 
absence of additional restrictions that address the selection problem, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that SNAP has a large positive or negative impact on the likelihood of poor health.   
To narrow the bounds, we assess the identifying power of the joint MTS-MIV and joint MTS-
MIV-MTR assumptions.  These results are traced out in Figure 2A and the corresponding table for the 
most relevant cases in our application in which P* lies between 0.456 and 0.700.  In drawing this figure, 
we assume that the fraction of misreporters does not vary across MIV groups. Focusing on the no-false 
positive classification error model, we begin by combining the MTS assumption with our MIV 
assumption that the probability of good health weakly increases with family resources, as measured by the 
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ratio of income to the poverty line.  In this joint MTS-MIV model, we can often sign the ATE as strictly 
negative without imposing the MTR assumption.  Specifically, Figure 2A reveals that we can identify 
ATE to be negative as long as food stamp misreporting is confined to no more than about 6% of 
households, ranging from a 12.8 percent reduction at P* = 0.456 to no effect at P* = 0.52.  When P* = 
0.50, the estimates imply that SNAP reduces food insecurity by at least 2.7 percentage points, although 
this upper bound is not statistically different than zero at the ten percent significance level.  
Under the joint MTR-MTS-MIV assumption, the average treatment effect is strictly negative 
even for large degrees of arbitrary food stamp misreporting.  Under this joint assumption, our estimated 
bounds on the ATE vary from [-0.808, -0.081] when P* = 0.456 to [-0.754, -0.081] when P* = 0.70.  In all 
cases, the estimates are statistically different than zero at the ten percent significance level.  Thus, under 
this model, we find that SNAP reduces the food insecurity rate by at least 8 percentage points and perhaps 
much more.  These results suggest that SNAP dramatically improves the likelihood of becoming food 
secure.   
 
 B.2. Other Health Outcomes 
We also consider what can be learned about the effects of food stamps on the three other negative 
health outcomes: self-reported fair/poor general health, childhood obesity, and anemia.  For brevity, we 
concentrate on results for cases when we impose the MTS-MIV and MTS-MIV-MTR models.  These 
results are summarized in Figures 2B-2D.   
As above for the case of food insecurity, we can identify strictly negative average treatment 
effects for each health outcome under the joint MTS-MIV assumption for sufficiently small degrees of 
food stamp reporting error.  For example, without any errors – i.e., when P* = 0.456 with no excess errors 
– the average treatment effects for fair/poor health, obesity, and anemia are identified to be no greater 
than -0.061, -0.033, and -0.032, respectively.  Identification of the ATE decays rapidly with P* for each of 
the health outcomes, however, and each upper bound becomes positive if fewer than 4 percent of the 
households might misreport food stamp participation status (under either arbitrary errors or no false 
positives).  Still, if the true participation rate is 0.50 (the rate consistent with the USDA administrative 
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data) under no false positives, the estimated upper bounds rule out the possibility the SNAP substantially 
increases the incidence of these poor health outcomes.  For example, the estimated bounds on the rate of 
poor general health is [-0.500, 0.005].  Thus, these results imply that SNAP may dramatically improve 
childhood health, as measured by poor health, obesity, and anemia, with little downside risk that the 
program instead has a deleterious average effect.   
 Finally, to shed additional light on the magnitudes of any identified beneficial effects of the 
program, we apply the MTR assumption that SNAP cannot lead to worse health outcomes.  Under the 
joint MTS-MIV-MTR, we estimate strictly negative (beneficial) and substantial impacts for each health 
outcome across all values of P* ∈ [0.456, 0.700], even for the case of arbitrary reporting errors.  In 
particular, at P* = 0.50 we find that SNAP reduces the rate of poor general health by at least 0.031 (from 
0.089 to 0.058), obesity by at least 0.053 (from 0.218 to 0.165), and anemia by at least 0.016 (from 0.020 
to 0.004).  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
The literature assessing the efficacy of SNAP has long puzzled over its positive associations with various 
undesirable health-related outcomes such as food insecurity.  These associations are often ascribed to the 
self-selection of less healthy households into SNAP.  Identification of the causal impacts of participation 
on health status is also confounded by systematic underreporting of food stamp recipiency.  In this paper, 
we reconsidered the impact of SNAP on child food insecurity and other health outcomes by developing 
methods that account for both of these identification problems in a single unifying framework.  Within 
this framework, we combine information from household self-reports with administrative data on the size 
of the SNAP caseload to derive formal restrictions on the magnitudes and patterns of household reporting 
errors.  While introducing measurement error widens Manski’s (1995) classic worst-case selection 
bounds, we show how restricting the magnitudes and patterns of errors can, in some cases, make it easier 
to sign the average treatment effect than under the standard implicit assumption of perfectly measured 
data.  Acknowledging the presence of nonrandom measurement error need not necessarily hinder 
inference on the sign of the average treatment effect.  
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Our partial identification approach is well-suited for this application in which conventional 
assumptions strong enough to point-identify the causal impacts are not necessarily credible and there 
remains much uncertainty about even the qualitative impacts of SNAP.  Using data from the National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), we make transparent how assumptions on the 
selection and reporting error processes shape inferences about the causal impacts of SNAP on health 
outcomes.  The worst-case selection bounds always include zero, and classification errors can generate 
substantial additional uncertainty about the efficacy of SNAP in alleviating food insecurity and other 
health outcomes.  This ambiguity, however, is substantially mitigated by applying relatively weak 
assumptions on the selection and classification error processes.    
 Our middle-ground MTS-MIV model allows us to identify strictly beneficial impacts of SNAP on 
food insecurity and other health outcomes as long as the degree of misreported participation status is not 
too large.  In the absence of measurement error, the joint MTS-MIV model reveals that SNAP reduces the 
prevalence of food insecurity by at least 12.8 percentage points (28%), from 0.459 to 0.331.  The strength 
of this finding naturally weakens when we allow for misclassified participation status.  Nevertheless, we 
can still identify that SNAP reduces the prevalence of food insecurity by at least 2.7 percentage points 
(6.5%), from 0.417 to 0.390, when allowing for errors of omission in participation status to be consistent 
with the estimated true participation rate of P* = 0.50.  Identification decays rapidly with the degree of 
misreporting, however, and confidence intervals for the average treatment effect include zero unless it can 
be known that only a small fraction of households misreport.    
Under the stronger joint MTS-MIV-MTR model, which may be less credible for obesity than the 
other health outcomes, the basic conclusion that SNAP improves health outcomes holds even for large 
degrees of measurement error.  Given errors of omission consistent with P* = 0.50, SNAP is estimated to 
reduce the prevalence of child food insecurity by at least 8.9 percentage points, poor general health by 3.1 
percentage points, obesity by 5.3 percentage points, and anemia by 1.6 percentage points.  These impacts 
are significantly different from zero for food insecurity and poor health.  These finding suggest that at 
least some of the potentially troubling correlations between SNAP and poor health outcomes provide a 
misleading picture of the true impact of SNAP.  The program appears to lead to at least modest reductions 
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in food insecurity and other poor health outcomes, with little downside risk that the program has 
significant deleterious effects.  Our estimated bounds are also consistent with the possibility that SNAP 
dramatically improves the well-being of children in the United States.  
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Table 1: Means by Reported Food Stamp Program Participation 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Income-eligible children
 
   Recipients (FS=1) 
 
 Nonrecipients (FS=0) 
Age in years       9.108  (0.099)     8.607***  (0.127)      9.527   (0.132)
Ratio of income to the 
poverty line 
      0.75 4  (0.011)     0.631***  (0.016)      0.857   (0.014)
    
Food stamp recipient       0.456  (0.022)   
    
Food insecure        0.400  (0.015)     0.450**   (0.023)      0.357   (0.024)
Poor or fair health       0.080  (0.005)     0.088     (0.008)      0.073   (0.007)
Obese       0.185  (0.008)     0.191     (0.014)      0.179   (0.012)
Anemiaa       0.012  (0.002)     0.013     (0.003)      0.010   (0.003)
    
 
Notes: Sample estimates weighted using the medical exam weight.  Standard errors in parentheses account for the 
sample design using the synthetic strata and PSU variables.  The estimated means for the SNAP recipient population 
are superscripted with *, **, or *** to indicate that they are statistically significantly different from the means for 
the nonrecipient population, with p-values less than 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, respectively, based on Wald statistics corrected 
for the sample design. 
  
a The sample size for anemia is 3,871 (with 1,888 food stamp recipients) due to missing observations.  The sample 
size for the other three outcomes is 4,418. 
 
 Table 2.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE of SNAP Participation Under No Measurement Error 
  
NHANES Outcomes: 
 
                       Food Insecurity    Poor Health      Obesity        Anemia 
                  
 Worst-Case:      p.e.†  [-0.445,  0.555]   [-0.455,  0.545]   [-0.466,  0.534]   [-0.460,  0.540] 
           CI‡  [-0.460   0.570]   [-0.470   0.559]   [-0.482   0.549]   [-0.474   0.555]  
 
 MTS:          p.e.  [-0.445,  0.093]   [-0.455,  0.015]   [-0.466,  0.012]   [-0.460,  0.003] 
           CI   [-0.460   0.139]   [-0.470   0.048]   [-0.482   0.050]   [-0.474   0.008] 
 
 MTS-MIV:      p.e.  [-0.366, -0.128]   [-0.398, -0.061]   [-0.411, -0.033]   [-0.391, -0.032] 
           CI   [-0.433  -0.034]   [-0.453  -0.005]   [-0.474   0.033]   [-0.450   0.006] 
           bias*   +0.027   -0.039      +0.019    -0.021     +0.022   -0.072      +0.008    -0.006 
  
 MTS-MIV-MTR:   p.e.  [-0.366, -0.149]   [-0.398, -0.061]   [-0.411, -0.041]   [-0.391, -0.034] 
           CI   [-0.433  -0.062]   [-0.453  -0.009]   [-0.474   0.000]   [-0.450   0.000] 
             bias   +0.027  -0.043      +0.019    -0.027        +0.022    -0.073      +0.008    -0.005 
 
 
 
                      Food Insecurity  
                   in the CPS    
                  
 Worst-Case:      p.e.  [-0.399,  0.601]   
           CI   [-0.412   0.614]    
 
 MTS:          p.e.  [-0.399,  0.178]     
           CI   [-0.501   0.406]     
 
 MTS-MIV:      p.e.  [-0.376,  0.138]    
           CI   [-0.412   0.205] 
           bias       +0.025    -0.083 
  
 MTS-MIV-MTR:   p.e.  [-0.376, -0.049]    
           CI   [-0.412   0.000] 
           bias   +0.025    -0.039 
  
                                                    
   † Point estimates (p.e.) and  ‡ 90% Imbens-Manski confidence intervals (CI) using 1,000 pseudosamples  
 * Corrected finite sample bias 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 1.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Food Insecurity as a Function of P*, the Unobserved 
 True SNAP Participation Rate:  Worst-Case and MTS Bounds 
 
 
 
 
                
       
      P* = P = 0.456            P* = 0.50                     P* = 0.70  
     
             
 Arbitrary errors     p.e.†  [-0.855,  0.944]       [-0.900,  0.900]       [-0.900,  0.700]  
                CI‡   [-0.868   0.956]       [-0.912   0.912]      [-0.913   0.712]      
                
No excess errors    p.e.   [-0.445,  0.555]        [-0.489,  0.599]       [-0.689,  0.700]   
               CI   [-0.460   0.570]      [-0.506   0.619]      [-0.706   0.712]        
                
                  
 Arbitrary errors     p.e.   [-0.855,  0.877]        [-0.900,  0.799]      [-0.900,  0.571]   
                  CI   [-0.868   0.904]       [-0.912   0.824]      [-0.913   0.589]      
                
 No excess errors    p.e.   [-0.445,  0.093]       [-0.489,  0.198]      [-0.689,  0.571]    
               CI   [-0.460   0.139]      [-0.506   0.238]        [-0.706   0.589]     
                                                    
   † Point estimates (p.e.) and  ‡ 90% Imbens-Manski confidence intervals (CI) using 1,000 pseudosamples  
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   Figure 2A. Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Food Insecurity as a Function of P*, the Unobserved 
          True SNAP Participation Rate:  MTS-MIV and MTS-MIV-MTR Bounds 
 
 
 
                               
 
                              P* = P = 0.456           P* = 0.50              P* = 0.70  
       
   (a)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.808,  0.402]   [-0.815,  0.368]   [-0.754,  0.368]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.874   0.543]   [-0.879   0.509]   [-0.816   0.511] 
                        bias†    +0.032   -0.051      +0.032   -0.046      +0.025    -0.054 
        
   (b)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.366, -0.128]   [-0.488, -0.027]   [-0.689,  0.208]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.433  -0.034]   [-0.553   0.074]   [-0.723   0.353] 
                        bias     +0.027   -0.039      +0.025   -0.039      +0.028    -0.063 
 
   (c)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.808, -0.081]   [-0.815, -0.081]   [-0.754, -0.081]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.874  -0.015]   [-0.879  -0.015]   [-0.816  -0.014] 
                        bias     +0.032   -0.032      +0.032   -0.032      +0.025    -0.032 
        
   (d)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.366, -0.149]   [-0.488, -0.089]   [-0.689, -0.081]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.433  -0.062]   [-0.553  -0.013]   [-0.723  -0.013] 
                        bias     +0.027   -0.043       +0.025   -0.042      +0.028    -0.032 
 
ATE  
0
0.208
0.368 
  0.700.50  P* 0.600.55 0.65 
 LB: MTS-MIV 
       (or MTS-MIV-MTR) 
no false positives 
arbitrary errors 
-0.808 
-0.754 
-0.689 
-0.366 
-0.128 
 0.402 
-0.815 
-0.089 
0.368 
UB: MTS-MIV 
-0.488 
UB: MTS-MIV-MTR-0.149 
-0.027 
† corrected finite sample bias 
Self-reported 
       rate  
Administrative  
        rate 
0.456 
-0.081 
  
Figure 2B.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Poor Health as a Function of P*, the Unobserved 
            True SNAP Participation Rate:  MTS-MIV and MTS-MIV-MTR Bounds 
 
 
 
                               
 
                              P* = P = 0.456           P* = 0.50              P* = 0.70  
       
   (a)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.475,  0.104]   [-0.514,  0.094]   [-0.664,  0.068]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.529   0.133]   [-0.572   0.122]   [-0.745   0.088] 
                        bias     +0.008   -0.010      +0.010   -0.009      +0.017    -0.006 
        
   (b)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.398, -0.061]   [-0.500,  0.005]   [-0.664,  0.068]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.453  -0.005]   [-0.552   0.075]   [-0.739   0.100] 
                        bias     +0.019   -0.021      +0.022   -0.014      +0.017    -0.010 
 
   (c)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.475, -0.031]   [-0.514, -0.031]   [-0.664, -0.031]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.529   0.000]   [-0.572   0.000]   [-0.745   0.000] 
                        bias     +0.008   -0.025      +0.010   -0.025      +0.017    -0.025 
 
   (d)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.398, -0.061]   [-0.500, -0.031]   [-0.664, -0.031]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.453  -0.009]   [-0.552   0.000]   [-0.739   0.000] 
                        bias     +0.019   -0.027      +0.022   -0.026      +0.017    -0.025 
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Figure 2C.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Obesity as a Function of P*, the Unobserved 
             True SNAP Participation Rate:  MTS-MIV and MTS-MIV-MTR Bounds 
 
 
 
                               
 
                              P* = P = 0.456           P* = 0.50              P* = 0.70  
       
   (a)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.587,  0.256]   [-0.625,  0.233]   [-0.764,  0.172]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.652   0.361]   [-0.695   0.329]   [-0.852   0.222] 
                        bias     +0.011   -0.074      +0.013   -0.056      +0.034    -0.020 
        
   (b)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.411, -0.033]   [-0.510,  0.057]   [-0.710,  0.102]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.474   0.033]   [-0.564   0.153]   [-0.772   0.218] 
                        bias     +0.022   -0.072      +0.023   -0.066      +0.034    -0.047 
 
   (c)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.587, -0.053]   [-0.625, -0.053]   [-0.764, -0.053]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.652   0.000]   [-0.695   0.000]   [-0.852   0.000] 
                        bias     +0.011   -0.045      +0.013   -0.045      +0.034    -0.045 
        
   (d)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.411, -0.053]   [-0.510, -0.053]   [-0.710, -0.053]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.474   0.000]   [-0.564   0.000]   [-0.772   0.000] 
                        bias     +0.022   -0.073      +0.023   -0.049      +0.034    -0.045 
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Figure 2D.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Anemia as a Function of P*, the Unobserved 
             True SNAP Participation Rate:  MTS-MIV and MTS-MIV-MTR Bounds 
 
 
 
                               
                              P* = P = 0.46             P* = 0.50              P* = 0.70  
       
   (a)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.402,  0.010]   [-0.437,  0.009]   [-0.601,  0.006]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.460   0.016]   [-0.499   0.014]   [-0.689   0.010] 
                        bias     +0.005   -0.003      +0.005   -0.002      +0.007    -0.002 
        
   (b)  MTS-MIV,          p.e.   [-0.391, -0.032]   [-0.437,  0.009]   [-0.601,  0.006]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.450   0.006]   [-0.498   0.028]   [-0.688   0.010] 
                        bias     +0.008   -0.006      +0.005   -0.008      +0.007    -0.002 
 
   (c)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.402, -0.018]   [-0.445, -0.016]   [-0.601, -0.018]  
       arbitrary errors       CI    [-0.460   0.000]   [-0.499   0.000]   [-0.689   0.000] 
                        bias     +0.005   -0.004      +0.005   -0.004      +0.007    -0.004 
        
   (d)  MTS-MIV-MTR,       p.e.   [-0.391, -0.034]   [-0.437, -0.018]   [-0.601, -0.018]  
       no false positives      CI    [-0.450   0.000]   [-0.498   0.000]   [-0.688   0.000] 
                        bias     +0.008   -0.005      +0.005   -0.004      +0.007    -0.004 
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Appendix A:  
Table A1 
 
Food Insecurity Questions in the Core Food Security Module 
 
1. “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
2. “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
3. “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.”  Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 
months? 
4. “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we were running out of money 
to buy food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
5. In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals 
because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
6. “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
7. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there wasn’t enough money for 
food? (Yes/No) 
8. (If yes to Question 5) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not every 
month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
9. “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
10. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because you couldn’t afford enough food? 
(Yes/No) 
11. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because you didn’t have enough money for food? (Yes/No)
12. In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there wasn’t enough 
money for food? (Yes/No) 
13. In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a whole day because there 
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
14. In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food? (Yes/No)
15. (If yes to Question 13) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not every 
month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
16. In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there wasn’t enough money for food? 
(Yes/No) 
17. (If yes to Question 16) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not every 
month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
18. In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough 
money for food? (Yes/No) 
 
Note:  Responses in bold indicate an affirmative response. 
 
  
  
  
Appendix B: 
Proof of Proposition 1: Subject to the restrictions in Equations (8) and (9), the upper bound is found by 
maximizing ሺߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ାሻ and minimizing ሺߠ଴ି ൅ߠଵାሻ, and vice versa for the lower bound.  
 
For ≥ For the upper bound, first consider the case that ߠଵ௎஻ି ൒ Δ.  Then ሺߠ଴ି ൅ߠଵାሻ is minimized at 
zero, and Equation (8a) simplifies to ߠଵି െ ߠ଴ା ൌ Δ.  Given Equations (8a)-(8c), we know that ߠ଴ା cannot 
exceed minሼߠ଴௎஻ା, ߠଵ௎஻ି െ Δሽ and ߠଵି cannot exceed minሼΔ ൅ ߠ଴௎஻ା, ߠଵ௎஻ିሽ.  From Equation (9), we know 
that ߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ା cannot exceed Qu.  The upper bound follows directly.  Second, consider the case that  ߠଵ௎஻ି ൏
Δ.  From Equation (8b), we know that ߠଵି  cannot exceed ߠଵ௎஻ି and, to satisfy the restriction in Equation 
(8a), ߠ଴ି  must be no less than Δ െ ߠଵ௎஻ି.  As before, ߠଵା is minimized at zero.  From Equation (8c), we 
know that ߠ଴ା can exceed zero but Equation (8a) implies that that any conjectured increase in the false 
positive error rate must be offset by an equivalent increase in the false negative error rate.  So, in this case, 
the upper bound would be unchanged by increasing ߠ଴ା above zero.  Thus, we have the upper bound of 
2ߠଵ௎஻ି െ Δ which can be shown to be no greater than 2ߠ଴௎஻ା ൅ Δ. 
     For the lower bound, first consider the case that ߠ଴௎஻ି ൒ Δ.  Then, ሺߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ାሻ is minimized at zero, 
and Equation (8a) simplifies to ߠ଴ି െ ߠଵା ൌ Δ.  Given (8a)-(8c), we know that ߠଵା cannot exceed 
minሼߠଵ௎஻ା, ߠ଴௎஻ି െ Δሽ and ߠ଴ି  cannot exceed minሼߠଵ௎஻ା ൅ Δ, ߠ଴௎஻ିሽ . From Equation (9), we know that 
ߠ଴ି ൅ ߠଵା cannot exceed Qu.  It follows that maxሼെܳ௨,െ2ߠଵ௎஻ା െ Δ,െ2ߠ଴௎஻ି ൅ Δሽ provides a lower bound 
on Θ.  Second, consider the case that ߠ଴௎஻ି ൏ Δ.  From Equation (8b), we know that ߠ଴ି  cannot exceed 
ߠ଴௎஻ି and, to satisfy the restriction in Equation (8a), ߠଵି  must be no less than Δ െ ߠ଴௎஻ି.  As before, ߠ଴ାis 
minimized at zero.  From Equation (8c), we know that ߠଵା can exceed zero but Equation (8a) implies that 
any conjectured increase in the false positive error rate must be offset by an equivalent increase in the false 
negative error.  So, in this case, the lower bound would be unchanged by increasing ߠଵା above zero.  Thus, 
we have the lower bound of െ2ߠ଴௎஻ି ൅ ∆ which can be shown to be no smaller than -2ߠଵ௎஻ା െ ∆.  
For < For the upper bound, first consider the case that ߠ଴௎஻ା ൒ െΔ.  Then ሺߠ଴ି ൅ߠଵାሻ is minimized at 
zero, and Equation (8a) simplifies to ߠଵି െ ߠ଴ା ൌ Δ.  Given Equations (8a)-(8c), we know that ߠଵି  cannot 
exceed minሼߠଵ௎஻ି , ߠ଴௎஻ା ൅ Δሽ and ߠ଴ା cannot exceed minሼߠଵ௎஻ି െ Δ, ߠ଴௎஻ାሽ. From Equation (9), we 
know that ߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ା cannot exceed Qu. The upper bound follows directly.  Second, consider the case where 
ߠ଴௎஻ା ൏ െΔ.  From Equation (8b), we know that ߠ଴ା cannot exceed ߠ଴௎஻ା and, to satisfy the restriction in 
Equation (8a), ߠଵା must be no less than െΔ െ ߠ଴௎஻ା.  As before, ߠ଴ି  is minimized at zero.  From Equation 
  
(8c), we know that ߠଵି  can exceed zero but the restriction in Equation (8a) implies that that any conjectured 
increase in the false negative error rate must be offset by an equivalent increase in the false positive error 
rate.  So in this case, the upper bound would be unchanged by increasing ߠଵି  above zero.  Thus, we have the 
upper bound of 2ߠ଴௎஻ା ൅ Δ which can be shown to be no greater than 2ߠଵ௎஻ି െ Δ.  
     For the lower bound, first consider the case that ߠଵ௎஻ା ൒ െΔ.  Then, ሺߠଵି ൅ ߠ଴ାሻ is minimized at 
zero, and Equation (8a) simplifies to ߠ଴ି െ ߠଵା ൌ Δ.  Given (8a)-(8c), we know that ߠ଴ି  cannot exceed 
minሼߠ଴௎஻ି, ߠଵ௎஻ା ൅ Δሽ and ߠଵା cannot exceed  minሼߠ଴௎஻ି െ Δ, ߠଵ௎஻ାሽ. From Equation (9), we know that 
ሺߠ଴ି ሻ ൅ ሺߠଵାሻ cannot exceed Qu.  It follows that maxሼെܳ௨,െ2ߠଵ௎஻ା െ Δ,െ2ߠ଴௎஻ି ൅ Δሽ provides a lower 
bound on Θ.  Second, consider the case that ߠଵ௎஻ା ൏ െΔ.  From Equation (8b), we know that ߠଵା  cannot 
exceed ߠଵ௎஻ା and, to satisfy the restriction in Equation (8a), ߠ଴ା must be no less than െΔ െ ߠଵ௎஻ା.  As 
before, ߠଵି  is minimized at zero.  From Equation (8c), we know that ߠ଴ି  can exceed zero but Equation (8a) 
implies that any conjectured increase in the false negative error rate must be offset by an equivalent 
increase in the false positive error.  So, in this case, the lower bound would be unchanged by increasing ߠ଴ି  
above zero.  Thus, we have the lower bound of െ2ߠଵ௎஻ା െ ∆ which can be shown to be no smaller than 
െ2ߠ଴௎஻ି ൅ ∆.

Proof of Proposition 2: The objective is to maximize 1   and minimize 1   subject to each conditional 
probability lying between 0 and 1 and the constraints in Equations (8) and (9).   
 
Case (i): When ܲ∗ ൏ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ, the first ratio in Equation (10) exceeds 1 unless 1   is at least as 
large as ߠଵା∗ ≡ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܲ∗.  At this value, the first ratio still exceeds 1 unless *1 0   .  The 
upper bound for this case is maximized at *1   and *1  , with the difference in Equation (10) reducing to 
௉ሺுୀ଴ሻ
௉ሺிௌ∗ୀ଴ሻ.  All constraints in Equations (8) and (9) are satisfied.  Case (ii): When ܲ∗ ൒ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ, 
set *1 0   and recall that ߠଵି ൑ minሼܳ௨, ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻሽ by Equations (8b) and (9). Also, 
the first ratio in Equation (10) exceeds 1 unless ߠଵି ൑  ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻ, which is 
nonnegative by assumption in Case (ii).  Thus, set   
*
1  ൌ minሼܳ௨, ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻሽ 
ൌ minሼܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 0ሻ, ܲሺܨܵ∗ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܲሺܪ ൌ 1, ܨܵ ൌ 1ሻሽ.  Again, all of the constraints in Equations 
(8) and (9) are satisfied.    
 
 
